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LAWYER TURF AND LAWYER REGULATION-THE
ROLE OF THE INHERENT-POWERS DOCTRINE*
Charles W. Wolfram**
Almost a year ago to this day in Washington, D.C., a consumeractivist group called HALT held their annual convention. HALT is
dedicated to arresting the power of lawyers and to expanding the prerogatives of non-lawyers in dealing with legal problems. HALT officers asked me to give a luncheon speech to HALT's members on the
so-called inherent-powers doctrine. I gave the speech and was carried
from the dining room on the shoulders of a jubilant audience.
Speaking to a roomful of smiling faces and approvingly nodding
heads is pleasant enough. But, it struck me at the time as less than
challenging to the ideas conveyed. Reading to them from their own
choirbook, I didn't need to persuade HALT members that lawyers
and courts were doing them in through the inherent-powers doctrine.
I would not be surprised to find that proposition stated as axiomatic
in HALT's charter. One forthright about the ideas in the talk, I said
to myself, should be prepared to speak the same sentiments to an audience of lawyers and law students. It was not long after that I was
asked to give this Altheimer Lecture. I readily agreed.
The Altheimer Lecture series has long been distinguished as a
forum for free-thinking figures concerned with legal ethics. My asso* Revised from a lecture delivered as the Ben J. Altheimer Lecture on April 14, 1989, at
the University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law. The author is pleased to
acknowledge the research assistance of Wayne C. Schiess '89 in preparing this lecture.
** Charles Frank Reavis, Sr., Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
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ciate reporter on the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, Professor Thomas D. Morgan of Emory School of Law, came before this
same lectern a year ago and very thoughtfully criticized the use of the
Chinese Wall as an all-purpose conflict-of-interest screening device in
law firms. ' He is now re-thinking a conceptualization of those notions
in the Restatement itself.2 Chinese Walls are much favored by law
firms, particularly large ones. I have no doubt that some here were
not too pleased with Professor Morgan's position. I trust that you
weren't too rough on him. My point is that Altheimer lecturers have
been provocative. I hope that I can follow in that tradition by provoking your critical thoughts and critical reactions.
This is not the same speech that I delivered to HALT's members.
Theirs was an informal luncheon talk. I forewarn you that this analysis is somewhat more substantial and much more lawyerly. However,
I have preserved the basic message and method of discourse of the
original talk. In so doing, I suspect that I will appear to many of you
as the sort of clumsy invited lecturer who goes home leaving no converts and few friends. Or, as a sociologist of the legal profession, who
is not a lawyer, recently put it, I risk conducting myself on this occasion like colonial administrators of European empires in the nineteenth century: setting foot on foreign shores to preach an ideology
that will almost certainly be resented, probably misunderstood, and
only occasionally vindicated.3
What I am about to say is largely critical of a doctrine that lawyers and judges have constructed and embraced. Even law students
might consider themselves the prospective objects of my barbs. Am I
just another tiresome lawyer-basher with a kinky disposition to bash
lawyers in front of other lawyers? You will never know, of course.
Lawyer-bashing has almost become an alternative national pastime.
It even enjoys some advantages over baseball; it can be played in the
winter as well as in warmer months, and you can play it indoors in
crowded conditions even better than outside. The chief advantage of
lawyer-bashing is that it is universally participatory-anybody can
play. Sometimes it seems as if everyone is.
In talks such as this, a selection of crude lawyer jokes typically
1. Morgan, Screening the Disqualified Lawyer: The Wrong Solution to the Wrong Problem, 10 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 37 (1987).
2. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (Preliminary Draft

No. 4A, 1989) and (Council Draft No. 3, 1989).
3. See HALIDAY, FORMATIVE PROFESSIONALISM AND THE THREE REVOLUTIONS:
LEGAL CAREERS IN THE CHICAGO BAR, 1850-1900, at 2 (1986) (American Bar Foundation

Working Paper No. 8715).
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make their obligatory appearance. I'll pass over them in the interests
of time and our senses of self-esteem. They are mainly tasteless and
only funny in a perverse or wicked way. Moreover, let me not be
misunderstood on a fundamental matter: I am a lawyer. I admire
and respect my profession and the members of it. I think lawyers
perform functions that are useful to society; some of them are indispensable. I firmly believe that it is both possible and natural for a law
school graduate to be a good lawyer and a good person. I cannot
conceive of a society that is at once both free and orderly that could
exist without a profession performing the tasks that lawyers perform
in ours. On those simple propositions, I take it, we are agreed.
Having said that, the main burden of my remarks will be to challenge lawyers to allow more competition, with the almost certain result that lawyers, at least the statistically average lawyer, will lose
income. I believe the lawyer monopoly is largely self-created and selfperpetuated, the arguments sustaining it are unconvincing, and the
particular doctrine I wish to examine cannot withstand analysis.
That doctrine is the inherent-powers doctrine-ajudge-made, lawyersupported 4 doctrine holding that courts, and only courts, may regulate the practice of law. The doctrine has many applications. One
particular use I will refer to from time to time concerns the unauthorized practice of law and the power that courts claim in defining that
exclusive turf on behalf of lawyers.
The role of the inherent-powers doctrine, particularly in the unauthorized practice debate that is now stirring around the nation, reminds me of a story told in the U.S.S.R. It concerns Boris, a KGB
guard at the gate of a state-owned factory. Every evening the scene
would unfold. Boris would stop the same worker, Yuri. Yuri was
about to wheel through the factory gate a wheelbarrow full of sawdust. Boris would yell, "Ha, Yuri! Trying to smuggle something out
in that sawdust, eh?" Boris would then dig into the sawdust and sift
and search, but he never found anything. Days, weeks, months went
by. The factory was consistently unprofitable, among other things,
because of the loss of inventory. The inept Party functionaries running the factory had to do something to validate their diligence. So
they sent guard Boris off to a labor camp in Siberia.
One day several winters later, Boris was surprised to see his old
4. Lawyer support is persistent and long-standing. As the most recent example, two
months ago in Denver at its semi-annual meeting, the American Bar Association House of
Delegates passed a resolution reasserting the exclusive province of courts in regulating the
legal profession. See McMillion, New Legislative Priorities,A.B.A. J., April 1989, at 129.
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nemesis Yuri arrive with a trainload of new inmates. "So," cried Boris, "they caught you at last. Tell me, what in the name of Mother
Russia were you stealing?" "My friend," said the worker, "you
should have known. I was stealing wheelbarrows."
It is perhaps not too hyperbolic to say that what lawyers and
their judicial colleagues have been doing for years in some areas of
law practice is stealing wheelbarrows. The problem is that lawyers
have defined a large area of human service as their exclusive preserve.
They have accomplished that by means of court rulings regulating
unauthorized practice and limiting admission to law practice. Many
reformist organizations that object to such rulings and that oppose the
resulting lawyer monopoly, spend much of their effort thinking of
ways to combat the rulings. In a sense, the reformers were only sifting sawdust, and missing the wheelbarrow.
The wheelbarrow, I would suggest, is that little-known legal doctrine of inherent-powers. Most nonlawyers have never heard of it, but
then most lawyers haven't either. You can talk to twenty lawyers at
random and I doubt that more than one or two would be able to
describe it with even rough accuracy. In former years I have talked to
colleagues who taught law school courses dealing with regulation of
the legal profession, and some of them were unaware of the full significance of the doctrine. But in many states it appears often enough
and with such powerful force that it has become a shield behind
which the legal profession has staked a claim to self-regulation radically unlike that of any other profession.
Let me first describe the doctrine of inherent-powers so that we
share an understanding of the general concepts and some points of
terminology. Then I would like to describe a few recent judicial decisions invoking the inherent-powers doctrine, and conclude with some
ruminations about where-one-goes-from-here.
I begin with a basic description of what I call the affirmative and
the negative aspects of the inherent-powers doctrine. The affirmative
aspect of the inherent-powers doctrine I find sound and compatible
with fundamental themes in the law. The affirmative aspect posits, in
effect, that, even in the absence of statutes specifically saying that a
court may do so, a court nonetheless "inherently" has the power to
regulate the legal profession. That aspect of the inherent-powers doctrine is a doctrine of empowerment.
Historically, this part of the inherent-powers claim is fairly wellfounded. There is the slight embarrassment of legislative enactments
clearly regulating lawyers--certain Acts of Parliament in thirteenth
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and fourteenth-century England and many more throughout the colonial and post-colonial periods in the United States.' But, for the most
part, Anglo-American courts, and not legislatures, have traditionally
served as the official body regulating lawyers. And, again for the most
part, courts have regulated lawyers without legislative authorization.
A century or more ago the predominant role of courts in regulating
lawyers would have seemed simply inescapable, natural, and inevitable to anyone. Most of the business of lawyers necessarily involved
going to the courthouse. Judges and lawyers formed a close social
group, traveling about the country on "circuit." Admission to practice law was admission to a court (a vestige that still remains as a
mandatory gateway to authorized law practice), and the examinations
required for admission were often conducted personally by judges or
by committees of lawyers appointed by judges.
Today, given the historical role of courts as regulators of lawyers,
it continues to make sense to perpetuate the premise of the affirmative
aspect of the inherent-powers doctrine. Of course, it is true that lawyers and the relationship of their work to courts have changed dramatically and almost certainly irreversibly. The average lawyer no
longer spends very much time in court. In fact, the great majority of
lawyers would starve if they had to make their livings out of court
appearances. Most lawyers make their money in their offices by giving advice, drafting documents, analyzing legal situations, assisting in
transactions on "deals" of all sorts-land deals, business deals, salary
deals, government-regulation deals. Very little of this involves work
in courts. Nonetheless, courts are staffed at the top exclusively by
lawyers, which is probably sound. It is fitting to have experts who
intimately know the special context of law practice take a leadership
role in providing regulatory guidance of the legal profession. In short,
I have no problem with continued judicial supervision of the legal
profession as a starting proposition.
As a matter of doctrine, the affirmative aspect of the inherentpowers doctrine starts, not with history or with everyday practical
reality, but with the language of state constitutions and with a kind of
reasoning about the nature of judicial functions. The language in the
state constitutions varies, but it basically runs something along the
following lines: "The judicial power shall be vested in courts consisting of a supreme court and such other courts of inferior jurisdiction as
the legislature may establish." The reasoning elaborates such stark
"judicial power" phrases into a proliferated concept that includes,
5. See C.

WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL

ETHICS 26 n.35 (1986).
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among the traditional powers of courts, the power to regulate the
practice of law.
I should add a parenthetical point of particular interest to an
Arkansas audience, and to others as well. When Dean Lawrence
Averill and I discussed inherent-powers as a theme for this talk, I had
overlooked the point-but an always helpful research assistant reminded me-that, possibly unique among all the states, Arkansas'
Supreme Court need not rely upon a doctrine of implied or inherent
power to regulate lawyers. That power explicitly belongs to the
supreme court in Amendment 28 of the Arkansas Constitution: "The
Supreme Court shall make rules regulating the practice of law and the
professional conduct of lawyers." 6 The date of the constitutional
amendment-1939-is suggestive. Although we were unable to
unearth any illuminating legislative history surrounding the 1939
amendment,7 one of my hunches is that, among other things, it had
something to do with a sub-theme of my remarks-the intertie with
regulating unauthorized nonlawyer practitioners. My suspicion is
that the amendment was intended, among other things, to remove any
doubt that the Arkansas Supreme Court was empowered to regulate
nonlawyers under the unauthorized-practice-of-law rubric. Despite
the Arkansas constitutional amendment, as I will discuss later, at
least one aspect of the doctrine of inherent powers-the focus of my
remarks-remains extremely relevant in Arkansas as elsewhere.
But that gets ahead of the story. My first point is simply this:
Were the affirmative aspect of the inherent-powers doctrine all there
were to it, there would be very little to say against the doctrine. But
there is a dark side of inherent-powers to which I now turn-its negative aspect.
Courts in almost every jurisdiction do not stop with the claim
that they have the inherent power to regulate lawyers. Courts further
claim that they have the exclusive prerogative of regulating lawyers.
That is obviously a much more grandiose claim. For example, to say
that as a citizen I have the power to vote normally does not also entail
6. ARK. CONST. amend. XXVIII.
7. The publisher's note to the amendment states that "the amendment was proposed by
initiative petition and approved at the general election on November 8, 1938, by a vote of
74,290 for and 46,932 against." Initiative petitions, of course, are launched by interested
groups of citizens, such as in this case bar associations, but I have been unable thus far to
identify the interests specifically behind the initiative. Apparently the first important use of the
court's power was promulgating rules regulating lawyers (the 1908 Canons of Ethics of the
American Bar Association). See Creekmore v. Izard, 236 Ark. 558, 568, 367 S.W.2d 419, 425
(1963) (McFaddin, J., dissenting).
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a claim that no other citizen has the same right. But that is essentially
what courts have claimed. The negative aspect means that an attempt
by a legislature or an administrative agency of a state to pass a law or
to write a regulation that affects lawyers or lawyering risks a judgment by the state's courts that the law is unconstitutional. The specific rationale of the courts is that, by enacting the law, the legislature
or the executive branch of government has overstepped the lines of
the separation-of-powers doctrine. Being unconstitutional, the attempted enactment is not law and the courts instead will either refuse
to enforce any regulation in the area or will enforce their own regulations, even if they dramatically conflict with the invalid legislation.8
It is this vast power under the inherent-powers doctrine to strike
down reforming legislation that is my chief concern. Just so there is
no misunderstanding, when I use the phrase inherent-powers from this
point on, you can safely assume that I am talking about its negative
aspect, and not its affirmative side. We could, of course, use the
phrase separation-of-powersto describe the doctrine, but I believe that
would only confuse rather than clarify. There is a general doctrine of
separation-of-powers-a doctrine that applies to every branch of the
government. Occasionally, that doctrine requires that courts invalidate legislation that effectively invades the province of a coordinate
branch of government. But that general doctrine is characterized by
judicial restraint in its application. In that important hallmark it
bears no close resemblance to its much more robust and shabby
cousin, the negative aspect of the inherent-powers doctrine.
Let me start my consideration of this negative aspect with a disclaimer in the form of a somewhat lengthy digression. I do not for a
moment claim that all possible applications of the negative aspect of
the inherent-powers doctrine are outlandish and doctrinally unsound.
In a milder form of the doctrine than is sometimes encountered, I
would have nothing critical to say against its application. Indeed, I
will urge that the doctrine should sometimes be applied when courts
have refused to do so. Consider two examples that strike me as entirely acceptable holdings of unconstitutionality.
First, suppose a state legislature passed a statute denying criminal defendants the right to be represented by lawyers, but instead required them to represent themselves or be represented by nonlawyers. Note, particularly, that the legislation has removed lawyers
entirely from the courtroom; it has not merely provided that others,
8. For an analysis of the negative aspect of the inherent-powers doctrine, see C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 27-31 (1986).
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at the free election of the accused, could represent an accused in place
of a lawyer.
That preposterous statute, of course, is in serious trouble under
the provisions of the federal and state constitutions that protect the
right to the assistance of counsel. But I think there is another good
reason why a state court also might hold the statute unconstitutional.
It is not really imaginable that courts could effectively try criminal
cases, employing even the minimal procedural guarantees of due process, unless lawyers were able to represent persons accused of crime.
The process of justice would virtually cease; certainly it would become impossibly unwieldy. The effect of the legislation on the courts
would be to trench deeply upon the ability of the courts to function in
an essential area. We can rather comfortably and confidently say that
it would impinge on the inherent powers of courts. I would gladly
join efforts to have the statute declared unconstitutional under the
negative aspect of the inherent-powers doctrine.
The actual cases are somewhat less obvious than a law professor's extreme hypothetical; no state legislature will write our first
imagined statute. But take a more life-like case-facts that very recently brought down a negative inherent-powers dictum from the
Supreme Court of Florida. The case, White v. Board of County Commissioners,' involves a variation on a situation that is all too familiar.
In our outrage over crime rates that appear to be rising, we demand
that our political leaders declare all-out war on crime. But then, unlike other wars, we show no enthusiasm for paying for its costs, and
our political leaders are fully aware of this reserve. Thus, when it
comes time for state legislatures to appropriate funds to implement
the state's obligation to provide the effective assistance of counsel to
those whom the state accuses of being in the wrong trenches in the
war against crime, the legislature often listens more carefully to the
strong under-current of citizen opposition to crime-fighting expenditures. The results are often ludicrously inadequate fee schedules for
compensating court-appointed lawyers in criminal cases.
The law in the area (although not the compensation) is rich. The
particular twist in the Florida case was that the legislature had extended the statutory cap on fees for capital cases.'o Thus, believe it or
not, a defense lawyer in a murder case in Florida in which the death
9.
10.
counsel
tal case

537 So. 2d 1376 (Fla. 1989).
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 925.035(2) (1985) (providing for compensation of appointed
in capital cases at rates provided in § 925.036); § 925.036(2)(d) (compensation in capi"shall not exceed" $3,500.00).
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sentence could be imposed was limited by statute to a fee of $3,500.00.
In White, that compensation worked out to fifty-five dollars per hour
for sixty-four hours of work in the trial of the case. Other cases, depending on the lawyer's decisions about how much time to invest in
the defense, might involve many more hours and a much lower hourly
rate of compensation. The problem is how to provide any kind of
effective defense with Florida's Depression-era pay ceiling for a capital case. One lawyer, the lawyer in White, resorted to the argument
that the courts should ignore the maximum fee set in the lawyer compensation statute. The Florida Supreme Court agreed. In a wideranging opinion, the court essentially held that providing competent
and appropriately motivated counsel in death-penalty cases required
that the statutory maximum be ignored in any case in which the lawyer's reasonable expenditure of time brought the lawyer's fee above
the cap. It

The Florida court anticipated its holding in White in an earlier
decision holding that it would exercise its inherent power to set aside
the statutory fee cap in some instances. The court in Makemson v.
Martin County'" held that a lawyer who reasonably and necessarily
spent 248.3 hours in defending a capital case was entitled to compensation at a rate above the statutory maximum, which would have
worked out to a maximum compensation of just under $14.11 per
hour. The court rested its decision firmly on the inherent-powers doctrine. 3 Finding that the facts were sufficiently extraordinary, the
court held that it had to ignore the statutory limit in order to enable
the court "to perform its essential judicial function of ensuring adequate representation by competent counsel."' 4

The later White decision, in effect, held that all death-penalty
cases were extraordinary and, accordingly, were occasions on which
trial courts should exercise the inherent power to ignore the statutory
fee cap. 5 The White court also firmly rested its decision upon the
11. Due to the bifurcated nature of the proceedings, the increased cost of living since
the statute was last amended, the amount of time and effort the attorney must expend, and the severity of the penalty faced by the defendant, a trial court must be
allowed to award fees in excess of the statutory maximum when appropriate.
537 So. 2d at 1380.
12. 491 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043 (1987).
13. Id. at 1112-13.
14. Id. at 1113.
15. 537 So. 2d at 1380. The court observed that: "We find that virtually every capital
case fits within this [extraordinary-circumstances] standard and justifies the court's exercise of
its inherent power to award attorney's fees in excess of the current statutory fee cap ...." Id.
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inherent-powers doctrine. 6
The approach of the Florida court is sound. There comes a point
at which compensation for defense counsel in capital cases is so low
that the court can have no confidence that a lawyer of ordinary prudence, competence, and economic needs will expend the effort needed
to secure a just result-at least a result that, if conviction occurs, will
be immune from being overturned on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel. The low fees, in short, may interfere with the functioning of the courts in just the way that, in the exotic hypothetical,
we concluded that a court would be jeopardized by legislation prohibiting lawyers from appearing to defend. The degree of impairment
from inadequate compensation is, of course, less. But at some point a
court is warranted in saying that the degree of impairment has
reached the point of unconstitutional encroachment on the essential
functioning of a court. At that point the legislative act is
unconstitutional.
Turning to Arkansas for a moment, I regret to say that the Arkansas Supreme Court has been much less venturesome than the Florida Supreme Court on the matter of legislative limits on compensating
court-appointed lawyers in criminal cases. The Arkansas legislation
provides shockingly low rates of compensation. In the double-speak
sometimes found in statutes, the Arkansas statute provides that "the
amount of the attorney's fee shall be not less than twenty-five dollars
($25.00) nor more than three hundred fifty dollars ($350). '"7 Surely,
the "not less than twenty-five dollars ($25.00)" is a cynical legislative
joke. It falsely suggests that judges hitherto had been compensating
lawyers at a lesser rate instead of their full entitlement of twenty-five
dollars. The amount allowed in a capital murder case is "not more
than one thousand dollars ($1,000)."" 8
Unfortunately, in my view, the Arkansas Supreme Court has ap16. Id. The court further explained that:
The statute is unconstitutional when applied in such a manner that curtails the
court's inherent power to secure effective, experienced counsel for the representation
of the indigent defendants in capital cases. At that point the statute impermissibly
encroaches upon a sensitive area of judicial concern and violates [the judicial article
of the state's constitution].
Id. at 1379.
17. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-92-108(b)(1) (1987). The statute shows similar generosity for
investigation expenses: "the amount allowed for investigation expenses shall not exceed one
hundred dollars ($100) ..
" Id. The $350.00 maximum has appeared in the statute at least
since 1977. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2419 (1977 Supp.). Adjusted downward for inflation
in the intervening years, the 1977 Arkansas statute originally provided a real-money equivalent
at least twice as large as the present paltry value.
18.

ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-92-108(b)(2) (1987).
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parently taken the absolute position that the statute is constitutional,
regardless of its impact upon the operation of the state's trial courts.
In State v. Ruiz, 9 a 1980 decision, the court rejected an inherentpowers attack on the statute that had been accepted in the trial court.
Instead, the supreme court held the statute constitutional because
lawyers could be forced to provide representation without any compensation, and because it was no fault of the counties involved that
the commission of a crime required the appointment of counsel. 20 So
much for the presumption of innocence. The court also held that the
lawyers involved were estopped to claim additional compensation because they had taken a solemn "lawyer's oath." In the oath, they
swore never to "reject, from any consideration personal to myself, the
cause of the defenseless or oppressed, or delay any man's cause for
lucre or malice. SO HELP ME GOD."' 2 1 (No similar oath, apparently, is taken by officers of counties in this state-or by officers of the
state itself.) Since the statute requires every lawyer to take the oath,2 2
the court is actually saying that it is constitutional for a state to coerce
lawyers into serving for free.2 3
Does this suggest that Arkansas does not follow the negative aspect of the inherent-powers doctrine? Not at all. More recently, two
years ago the supreme court held in Ball v. Roberts 24 that another
Arkansas statute was unconstitutional under that very doctrine. The
contrast between Ball and Ruiz is fascinating. While each decision
involved the problem of providing court-appointed lawyers to indigent defendants in criminal cases, the cases reached diametrically opposite results. Ball involved a legislative amendment to the very
statute involved in Ruiz. The amendment bears reciting:
An attorney shall not be so appointed by a court if the attorney
certifies to the court, in writing, that he or she has not attended or
taken a prescribed course in criminal law in an accredited school of
law within twenty-five (25) years prior to the date of appointment,
19. 269 Ark. 331, 602 S.W.2d 625 (1980).
20. Id. at 335, 602 S.W.2d at 627.
21. Id. at 334, 602 S.W.2d at 627.
22. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-22-205 (1987).
23. A more recent decision of the United States Supreme Court sheds little direct light on
the constitutionality of coercing lawyers to serve as court-appointed counsel without adequate
compensation. See Mallard v. United States District Court, 109 S.Ct. 1814 (1989) (5-4 decision) (under statute permitting federal district court to "request" counsel to serve indigent in
civil case, court was not empowered to require such service when lawyer asserted incompetence). The majority in Mallard was careful to point out that the Court was not passing on the
constitutionality of schemes to compel counsel to serve without compensation. Id.at 1821 n.6.
24. 291 Ark. 84, 722 S.W.2d 829 (1987).
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that the attorney does not hold himself or herself out to the public
as a criminal lawyer, and that he or she does not regularly engage
in the practice of criminal law.2 5

In short, the statute said that an apparently incompetent criminal
defense lawyer need not serve. "Unconstitutional," said the court:
the statutory amendment infringes on the exclusive judicial power to
regulate the practice of law and professional conduct of lawyers. E6
For whatever reason and with whatever effects, the Arkansas
Supreme Court in Ball, unlike its approach in Ruiz, struck down legislation as unconstitutional under the negative aspect of the inherentpowers doctrine.
It seems to me that the court got it precisely backwards in the
Ruiz and Ball decisions. If the court had declared the ludicrous feelimitation statute unconstitutional in Ruiz, adequate numbers of competent criminal defense lawyers could be found to shoulder the bur-

den that the court in Ball felt compelled to force upon every lawyer in
the state, whether competent or not. Perhaps the court in Ball felt it
had to spread fairly the wretched burden of inadequately compensated court appointments. With whatever practical effects, the cases
establish two other points about the doctrine's embodiment of the
negative aspect of the inherent-powers doctrine-its unpredictability
and the looseness with which it is applied.
Far better, it seems to me, would be a doctrine that hews more
closely to the essence of the sensible separation-of-powers concept
that underlies the negative aspect.2 7 Legislation, and to a lesser extent
25. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-92-108(d) (1987) (added by 1985 Ark. Acts, No. 1076, § 1).
26. Under the statute, a law student intending to head into general practice would have
some incentive to avoid electing criminal law as a law school course. Omitting to take the
course would provide an automatic opt-out under the statute, which might be advantageous
because of the very low rate of compensation for criminal defense appointments. Possibly the
Ball decision is to be understood, in part, as a judicial method of assuring that law students not
labor under unwise and artificial constraints in deciding whether to elect an important law
school course.
Among other bizarre effects, the legislation effectively limits the burden of court appointments to two groups of lawyers-those who regularly practice criminal defense work and
younger lawyers. Established lawyers in the twilight last-third of their careers in civil practice
would be entirely relieved. Such lawyers are also, of course, statistically those in the best
economic position to assume the heavy financial burdens of court appointments under the
Arkansas statute.
27. What follows is a summary of arguments considered in greater detail in C. WOLFRAM,
MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 2.2.3, at 27-31 (1986). For an excellent analysis, upon which the
above draws heavily, that employs a very similar "functional" analysis of judicial and legislative powers, see Kalish, The Nebraska Supreme Court, the Practiceof Law and the Regulation
of Attorneys, 59 NEB. L. REV. 555 (1980). Professor Kalish's analysis deserves much greater
attention than courts have given it.
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executive actions, may be thought to trench in all sorts of ways upon
the judicial branch-if by "trench" we mean affect in any significant
way. (The same is true, of course, of the effect of judicial action upon
legislation-for example, judicial decisions construing a statute.) It
simply will not do, however, to employ the inherent-powers doctrine
as if it attempted to preclude literally any member of one branch from
exercising any power that affects another branch.2" Surely it is not
enough that legislation or executive action affects the judicial branch.
Such a broad-brush approach, if applied consistently, would make it
unconstitutional for a legislature to take such steps as appropriating
funds to pay the salaries of judges. And surely it is not enough, to
justify the inherent-powers doctrine in a particular case, that the legislation in question affects judicial functions in a way that judges regret
or might do differently were they elected members of the legislature.
The interactions and interconnections between the common law and
legislation are many and fascinating; but surely the mere fact that a
judge, or a bench of appellate judges, disagrees with a statutory formulation has, in no other area of the law, been thought sufficient to
invalidate the statute. In many states, for example, the rules of evidence to be employed in courts are enacted by the legislature. It
would be insensible in such a state to hold that the statutory definition
of an evidentiary privilege offends the separation-of-powers concept
simply because the court would have defined the privilege differently
if it were to consider it under its common-law jurisdiction.
The key to applying the inherent-powers doctrine is best found in
a formula that I borrow loosely from the great conservative
proceduralist, the late Henry M. Hart, Jr. Professor Hart is best
known for his work in connection with the jurisdiction of federal
courts. On the question of the extent to which Congress may enact
legislation that strips jurisdiction from the Supreme Court, Hart took
the position that such legislation, no matter (I would add) how regrettable from a policy point of view, should not be struck down unless its
effect would be that of destroying the essential role of the Supreme
Court in the constitutional scheme.29 While there are potentially interesting parallels between Hart's problem and ours, for present purposes I wish only to borrow the phrase and its embedded idea and
28. I engage here in a careful near-paraphrase of the separation-of-powers provision of the
Arkansas Constitution: "No person, or collection of persons, being one of these departments
[legislative, executive, judicial], shall exercise any power belonging to either of the others ....
ARK. CONST. art. 4, § 2.
29. See Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdictionof Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1365 (1953).
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leave behind the peculiar baggage of the jurisprudence of jurisdictionstripping statutes.
What makes the negative aspect of the inherent-powers doctrine
potent and controversial is that it is applied far beyond the isolated
example of legislation that cuts to the very core of essential judicial
functions. Instead, the courts in many states have invoked the negative aspect of the doctrine to outlaw legislation that has nothing to do
with lawyers functioning in courts. The logic that courts have followed runs approximately3" as follows:
Major Premise: Courts have the inherent power to regulate the
legal profession.
Minor Premise: Legislation that also attempts to regulate the legal
profession trenches upon that power of the judiciary.
Quod erat demonstrandum: The legislation violates the separation-of-powers provisions of the state constitution, and it is void.
The problem with the argument is that its concept of separate
powers of the branches of government reminds us of flat-earth geography. It attempts to define all of governmental reality from the perspective of the viewer-the courts, in this case. It purports to take
literally the Fourth-of-July rhetoric about each of the three branches
being protected against invasion of its province in any way. But the
plain fact is that separation-of-powers, as with many other doctrines
of American state and national constitutional law, is not a doctrine of
absolutes; it is not a doctrine about air-tight separation. It is a doctrine, more or less, of balance and accommodation. It is a doctrine
that says regulation through law works best if it is an interrelated
enterprise among the branches. It is also a doctrine that should give
primacy to the most truly democratic organ of government: the
legislature.
The negative aspect of the inherent-powers doctrine is a very
powerful tool in regulating the legal profession and in forcing upon a
state's population a conception of public policy in a wide range of
vaguely related areas that is held by a court-and-lawyer elite. Under
that conception, state courts have at least threatened to hold void
many legislative and executive branch attempts to regulate the legal
profession in any but the most indirect ways. Courts have, in effect,
employed the concept to keep the legislative and administrative
30. The reader's natural temptation to suspect that the paraphrase is unfair can be quickly
put to rest by considering such decisions as Ball v. Roberts, 291 Ark. 84, 722 S.W.2d 829
(1987).
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branches off the exclusive judicial turf of "regulating the legal
profession."
Let me illustrate the working of the negative aspect of the inherent-powers doctrine with some recent decisions drawn from courts
around the country. One of my favorite decisions was brought to my
attention by a student writing a law review note.3 1 She came into my
office amazed by a decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court. The
decision 32 had declared unconstitutional a recently enacted state statute providing that monies collected by the Minnesota Supreme Court
from lawyers in the state as their annual registration dues should be
deposited in the state treasury. Because regulating the legal profession was the exclusive role of the state supreme court and because the
statute, no matter how mildly, also dealt with regulating the legal profession, the statute was void.
Another illustrative decision comes from Idaho.3 3 A state administrative agency dealt with the problems of business people. It
found these problems were often relatively minor matters of small
business people, neither complex nor weighty enough to warrant requiring applicants to hire lawyers to represent them before the
agency. The agency thus adopted a rule providing that, for the purpose of appearances before the administrative agency in minor matters, a person with a small business34 did not have to be represented
by a lawyer. There was nothing to suggest that the Idaho administrative agency was in any way saying the nonlawyer could continue the
representation if the matter were later taken to court. The regulation
only applied to activities directly before the agency. "Foul deed!" decreed the Idaho Supreme Court. The regulation purports to deal with
the practice of law, and that is the exclusive turf of the judges.
There are more such cases, but those sufficiently illustrate the
point. Those cases are not common, but I do assert they are typical.
They illustrate, perhaps in the same distorted fashion as the cover of a
body-building magazine, what the inherent-powers doctrine can become at its most grotesquely developed stage.
31. Her student note remains one of the best studies of the inherent-powers doctrine. See
Note, The Inherent Power of the Judicialto Regulate the Practiceof Law-A ProposedDelineation, 60 MINN. L. REV. 783 (1976).
32. Sharood v. Hatfield, 296 Minn. 416, 210 N.W.2d 275 (1973).
33. Idaho State Bar Ass'n v. Idaho Pub. Utilities Comm'n, 102 Idaho 672, 637 P.2d 1168
(1981).
34. The regulation permitted a "partner, officer, duly authorized representative" or lawyer to represent a utility or motor carrier with annual gross income less than $100,000. Id. at
673, 637 P. 2d at 1169.
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There is one more important part to the story, a way of toning
down the inevitable tension that the inherent-powers doctrine can create between court and legislature. In some decisions, although in only
some, a state supreme court might be led to say that, while a statute
or regulation "technically" violates the inherent-powers doctrine, the
court will forebear striking it down because the court agrees with the
policy objectives of the statute. The court will therefore enforce the
statute under its affirmative inherent-powers jurisdiction and in the
spirit of comity.3" The end of it is that the statute is saved and given
effect. Again, that result is not common, and the occasions on which
the comity notion will be invoked are not readily predictable. For the
most part, the statutes that are saved by the comity doctrine from
judicial vaporization seem to be housekeeping rules that receive the
strong support of the bar or at least avoid the opposition of the legal
profession.
What is the legal and political impact of the negative aspect of
the inherent-powers doctrine? The impact is clear-and clearly disturbing. Consider the following points.
First, lawyers, and only lawyers, now regulate the legal profession. Lawyers entirely control the process by which lawyer rules of
conduct are written and adopted. In drafting disciplinary rules, every
state to a greater (usually) or lesser (infrequently) extent follows the
lead of the American Bar Association. Often states follow that lead
slavishly. And only a lawyer would think that many of the departures
are truly significant. The ABA calls the major shots and most of the
minor ones. The ABA is a private, exclusive, unrepresentative national organization whose membership consists only of lawyersnonlawyers need not apply. It has never included even half of all lawyers in the United States, and is skewed toward large-firm, older, and
established lawyers.
Lawyers dominate the process of lawyer discipline--or lawyer
non-discipline, as one's perception might have it in some jurisdictions.
True, a trend has recently developed in the states to admit non-lawyers to positions in decision-making bodies in certain bar-regulatory
agencies, such as lawyer discipline agencies. But the invitation is issued only by the organized legal profession and seems to be issued
35. See, e.g., McKenzie v. Burris, 255 Ark. 330, 342, 500 S.W.2d 357, 365 (1973) (statute
extending right of comity to out-of-state lawyer to practice in state construed as aiding and not
superseding or detracting from power of courts); Arkansas Bar Ass'n v. Union Nat'l Bank, 224
Ark. 48, 54, 273 S.W.2d 408, 412 (1954) (statute defining unauthorized practice of law by
banks "given approval" by court because statute was "considered to be in aid of the judicial
prerogative to regulate the practice of law and not to be in derogation thereof").
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only to friends, or at least not avowed critics, of the legal profession.
Moreover, the invitations are not issued in great numbers. I am
aware of no lawyer disciplinary agency in which nonlawyers constitute a majority of members or in which nonlawyers really exercise
leadership roles.
Second, lawyers, and only lawyers, define the extent to which the
legal profession will face economic competition. This is accomplished
by the legal profession's control of the very concept and definition of
legal services. Control occurs in several ways and on several linked
fronts.
Lawyers control admission to law practice-the chief means of
regulating the number of lawyer-competitors. Lawyers, and only lawyers, determine what requirements will be imposed on applicants,
what questions will be asked on bar examinations, how those examinations are to be graded, and what a minimal passing score must be.
Lawyers, and only lawyers, control the entire process of preparation for admission. As part of the admission process, with a few trivial exceptions, almost every person seeking admission to practice
today must pursue a lengthy and expensive course of legal education.
Because of rules made by lawyers, legal education must occur in institutions that are operated and controlled almost entirely by lawyers.
Lawyers, and only lawyers, also define the large areas of human
activity that only lawyers can engage in. They can do this, of course,
because only lawyers control the process of defining the unauthorized
practice of law-the doctrines and rules that define and limit those
areas of "the practice of law" that only lawyers may touch. The inherent-powers doctrine very importantly limits the power of the legislature in almost every state to retract any part of that definition.
Lawyers also entirely control the measures by which unauthorizedpractice regulations are enforced-both criminal and civil enforcement lawsuits.
Third-and this forms the tap-root of the legal profession's
power-lawyers, and only lawyers, control almost all of the levers of
power that are necessary for establishing the basic ground rules by
which power will be divided between the legal profession, their clients, and the public. By that, I refer to the readily observable fact
that only lawyers control the process of judicial decision by which
acts of the legislature or regulations of administrative agencies can be
declared invalid or protected against such declarations. The inherentpower doctrine stands as a powerful barrier shielding the legal profession from any of its critics who wish to urge legislative reform of the
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profession. Because the inherent-powers doctrine is based on the state
constitution, it is only by the cumbersome process of constitutional
reform that either clients or the public can clearly seize back from the
legal profession the power to control the work of the legal profession
and both the force and direction of the impacts of the legal profession
upon both clients and the public.
In short, the very definition of unauthorized practice is itself
claimed to be part of the exclusive province of the courts. At the very
most, according to some courts, it is a power of definition that the
courts are prepared to share only at the margins-only, in fact, when
the courts agree with the far-reaching sweep of prohibition defined by
the legislature.
The legal profession has in that way both identified and "protected" the interests of clients and the public without permitting them
to participate in any way in those processes. We should not be surprised that neither clients nor, to an increasing extent, the public believes that that arrangement adequately protects public and client
interests.
Lawyers did not invent this process of self-regulation, although
they may have perfected it as an art form. Most other professions and
work groups have accomplished a more modest form of self-regulation. This is more or less true in medicine, nursing, accounting, veterinary practice, barbering, horseshoeing, cosmetology, plumbing,
carpentry, engineering, the ministry, architecture, midwifery, dentistry, selling real estate, selling stock, and so on. Those occupational
groups have, to a greater or lesser extent, also been successful in establishing admission barriers and unauthorized-practice restrictions
and in exercising a measure of self-regulation.
What is profoundly different about the legal profession is that
lawyers, and only lawyers, have the powerful advantage of the negative aspect of the inherent-powers doctrine. That doctrine permits
lawyers, and only lawyers, to frustrate attempts at legislative or administrative reform of their profession. I think you can now see the
absolutely pivotal role that this little-known doctrine plays in warning
off the field of lawyer self-regulation any regulatory aspirant other
than the legal profession itself. Doctors don't have it, plumbers don't
have it, not even stock brokers have it. If we don't like the way doctors are regulating themselves, at least we know that if we undertake
the time-consuming and expensive process of lobbying a reform measure through a state legislative body, the reform will have a chance to
take hold. That has been a proven waste of time, or largely so, in
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many states in which nonlawyer groups have attempted to take back
some of the turf that lawyers have captured for themselves.
Is there any answer? Must client groups, legal reformers, and the
public at large accept exclusive lawyer domination of their self-defined
province of legal services? The balanced answer, I believe, is that
there are three kinds of constructive measures that critics and others
interested in the reform of the legal profession can take. The measures are difficult and problematic, but they offer some hope of pushing
through reform from outside the legal profession. One measure is
constitutional amendment. The other is the passage of legislation.
(Although I just described legislation as largely a waste of time, I will
elaborate on that shortly.) The third is more fundamental legal
reform.
The first method, constitutional amendment, would have as its
objective altering the basic document on which the inherent-powers
doctrine is said to rest: the state constitution. The possibilities for
amendment include an across-the-board approach-for example, a
state constitutional amendment simply providing that the legislative
and executive branches, equally with the judicial, also have the power
to regulate the legal profession. A gradualist in reform politics might
urge a less drastic approach-an amendment, perhaps the first in a
series, providing, for example, that a named administrative agency
has the power to admit nonlawyers to practice before it or providing
that real estate agents, as well as lawyers, have the power to fill out
land purchase contract documents.3 6
Constitutional amendment is no easy matter. It requires coalition building, a political war chest, diligent effort, and the right political climate including sympathetic handling by a mercurial and
largely ill-informed media-in short, large measures of those four indispensable political ingredients: friends, cash, work, and good luck.
Second, legislation is worth thinking about, even though it might
well fall victim to the inherent-power doctrine in many jurisdictions,
and thus prove worthless, from one perspective. In other words, it
might, for example, be worthwhile for state legislatures to attempt to
reduce the broad sweep of the definition of unauthorized practice of
law, despite the threat of a judicial veto. Two reasons suggest that
such an effort on selected issues might bear fruit. First, in many
36. That particular reform would not be necessary in Arkansas following the decision in
Creekmore v. Izard, 236 Ark. 558, 367 S.W.2d 419 (1963), limiting in part Arkansas Bar Ass'n
v. Block, 230 Ark. 430, 323 S.W.2d 912 (1959), and Block v. Arkansas Bar Ass'n, 233 Ark.
516, 345 S.W.2d 471 (1961).
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states, a state legislature, once aroused on an issue, is not an institution with which a state supreme court will lightly trifle. Recall the
possibility that the court will regard a particular measure-particularly one that has very wide legislative and public support-as a step
that the court should accept as a matter of "comity." The reform
might be able to run the gauntlet of the negative aspect of the inherent-powers doctrine without serious injury. Second, if the court
strikes down the legislation, the episode could result in a political situation more congenial to generating the support needed for a state constitutional amendment. Legislators, naturally, don't like to have
courts strike down their enactments. The inherent-powers basis for
such a ruling would be of very limited appeal beyond the legal profession, and the legal profession would almost certainly find itself very
much on the defensive in any follow-up campaign to obtain constitutional relief.
The third, and final, type of approach is systemic reform. Let me
edge my way into systemic reform by telling you about some conversations I have had over the years. Because, I suspect, my name sometimes appears in the media in connection with legal ethics issues, I
occasionally receive telephone calls from strangers in places both far
and near. Some callers are nonlawyers complaining about the high
cost and frustrating delay associated with the lawyer-dominated process of estate probate. Probate, of course, is the process by which the
homes and other possessions of decedents pass to their children and
other heirs. Probate of most estates almost always follows if decedents leave their property by will and inevitably follows if they don't.
In each case, the caller wanted to know what they could do about a
lawyer problem. The lawyer had, for example, written a will for a
now-dead client that funneled all of the client's property through probate. It also named the lawyer as the executor of the probate estate
and-although this is never stated in the will-permitted the lawyerexecutor to hire his or her own law firm as the "attorneys for the
executor." The unknowing testator, of course, probably thought that
the point of naming a lawyer as executor was to obtain whatever legal
help was needed. The upshot is that the fees of the two professionals
mount nicely. The lawyer-executor signs a check to pay a heating bill
(on the house that stands vacant while the laborious process of probate grinds on), and the lawyer-executor's law partner sagely reviews
the check for legal flaws. Each of the two then bills the estate for
separate services.
The result, of course, is that the $250,000 house that was to go to
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the decedent's children must be sold to pay off the $15,000 "executor's fee" and the $17,000 legal fees of the "attorneys for the executor." The modest estate is substantially diminished by two sizable
fees of professionals who perform duties that, almost without exception, most high school drop-outs could be taught to execute.
Someone distressed by an overblown and unnecessary system of
probate administration might decide to take action in one of several
different ways. The reformer might, for example, if he was a Connecticut businessman named Norman Dacey, sit down and write a madas-hell book called How to Avoid Probate,3 7 play the fox that starts the
bar association hounds in unauthorized-practice pursuits for several
years, and then enjoy a wealthy old age on the book royalties that flow
in following all the publicity. I'm sure Mr. Dacey enjoyed his moral
triumph as much as his financial success. And I detect that most law
students who learn of Mr. Dacey harbor at least a touch of admiration for the grit of a person who stood up to persistent attack by an
entrenched arm of the establishment. But Dacey's position in a gallery of national demi-heroes is equivocal. After all, he left the probate
system itself basically untouched. In fact, some people might use his
probate-avoidance suggestions in a clumsy and injurious way. The
complex probate system remains both dominated by lawyers and
firmly in place both before and after Dacey, and courts can strike
down a Dacey "living trust" or construe it in unkindly fashion, unless
it's done just right.
Another reaction to the scandal of probate might be to try to
provide the same high-priced services that lawyers provide in probate
administration, but at a much lower price. One could readily do that
through probate administration using only the services of paralegals
and clerical staff--except for one important consideration. It would
be against the law in every state I know of to have such an enterprise
operate in any way except under the direction and control, and for the
ultimate profit, of a lawyer. Probate administration by nonlawyers
practicing alone would constitute the unauthorized practice of law.
Moreover, even if it were possible for paralegals practicing alone to
practice probate law, there is no reason to think that nonlawyers
would prove any less grasping than lawyers once they got a toe-hold
in probate administration. Remember guard Boris and the worker
with the wheelbarrow. There is not much point to supplying wheel37. This all-time best-selling legal aid for everyman can be found at popular-book counters everywhere. The seventeenth edition (1987) claimed on its cover that over 2,500,000 copies of prior editions had been sold.
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barrows to more workers if we just end up having more wheelbarrows
ripped off.
It seems to me far better to take a long, hard look at the procession of wheelbarrows going past us-in the instance under immediate
scrutiny, at the system of probate itself. Would the world be better off
by bringing probate down to earth by eliminating it in many cases or,
at least, making it optional? Why not simply eliminate the traditional
system of probate for anyone who elects to do without its arcane, intricate, heavily lawyered, horribly expensive and largely unnecessary
protection? Now you probably are aware that just such schemes are
being actively pursued in several states. California, as one example,
passed legislation in 1986 that will allow many estates to escape the
worst of the expense and delay of probate through a process called
"simple probate.""a
Those sorts of systemic reforms-simple probate, no-fault automobile insurance protection, do-it-yourself divorces, realtor-handled
land transactions-are the sorts of legislative reforms that, if well
drafted, can accomplish three worthwhile goals.
First, they can remove much of the unnecessary expense and delay that often accompany routine tasks performed by lawyers.
Second, those reforms leave law and its administration much
closer to the common man and woman and much less in the exclusive
control of mysterious professional processes, and thus they will surely
lead to better public understanding and acceptance of their
consequences.
Third, and germane to our immediate present purpose, they can
be accomplished through legislation immune from the threat of the
inherent-powers doctrine. They do not attempt to regulate the practice of law as such. They simply, but profoundly, make the practice of
law irrelevant to an area of human behavior where lawyers are largely
not needed.
In conclusion, suppose, for a heady moment, that we lived in a
world in which such reforms were in place. Would we then live in a
political and social Nirvana? Could we all then realize that most persistent of utopian dreams-a society without lawyers? Would I be out
of a job as an educator of lawyers? Would you be out of jobs as lawyers? I hardly think so, although there would doubtless be fewer law
students in the United States. There would still be plenty of problems
and issues to occupy the very real and very important talents that
38. See CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 13000 to 13660 (West 1989 Supp.) (added by 1986 CAL.
ch. 783, § 24, effective July 1, 1987).
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good lawyers possess. Lawyers should be about those socially necessary and socially useful tasks. They should leave the rest to others, or
at least not prohibit others from doing what they can to lead the kinds
of professional lives that good lawyers lead: serving the public and
making a decent living while doing it.

